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Abstract. In this paper we propose a new method in experimental economics, 
designed to evaluate the effectiveness of public policy incentives aimed at 
altering consumer behaviors. We apply this method to wide-ranging policies on 
food prices, which use subsidies to increase the consumption of healthy products 
and taxes to reduce that of unhealthy ones. Our protocol allows for observation 
of an individual’s daily food consumption before and after the policy. We 
examine two separate policies: the one subsidizes fruit and vegetables, while the 
other one combines taxes and subsidies. We measure their nutritional and 
economic impacts on the choices of low-income French consumers, compared to 
a reference group. Both policies have a positive effect on the nutritional quality 
of food choices of the two groups but initial gaps widen, especially with the 
subsidies. In the low-income group this can be explained by an initially 
unfavorable pattern and by weaker price elasticities. The redistributive effects 
are therefore doubly regressive. Moreover, the individual price elasticities, that 
the experimental approach enables us to measure, show widely diverse 
behaviors. They are counter-effective for close to 40% of our sample of poor 
women. 
 
Key words: economics of obesity, social inequalities, poverty, income 




With over-nutrition and nutritional imbalance, the quality of the food diet is 
matter of concern to public authorities in developed countries. Suggested 
solutions include altering relative prices of food by either applying so-called fat 
taxes on the most harmful foods or instituting subsidies on the consumption of 
the healthiest foods like fruits and vegetables. In this article we examine the 
effectiveness of such public policies on food prices applied to the French case. 
Until now, the effects of such policies have been extrapolated from econometric 
approximations of real data on current conjuncture fluctuations of prices or on a 
few policies that were effectively implemented. Unlike those on tobacco, for 
example, these price policies have always been limited and have yielded 
disappointing socially regressive results (Powell and Chaloupka, 2009). In this 
paper we propose a new method to address this issue, based on laboratory 
experimentation. Using a small, highly flexible model, this method enables us to 
implement a generalized, wide-ranging price policy. It is potentially applicable 
to other incentive policies, especially information on nutrition. We focus here on 
the differing impacts of strict price policies on the nutritional quality of the food 
that women in the lowest income groups buy. 
With this approach we measure the effectiveness of a price policy very directly, 
by observing its impact on individuals’ diets. For a given individual (within-
subjects design), for a set period (daily food intake), in a strictly controlled 
context that is reproducible and ceteris paribus, we observe all this individual’s 
food choices, before and after the implementation of the policy. The method 
enables us to simulate different kinds of policy and to observe their effects 
immediately. It also enables us to avoid most of the noise that affects 
econometric analysis of data from existing databases. Consistent with the norms 
of experimental economics, these consumption choices are with monetary 4 
 
                                                
incentives. In other words, we observe actual choices and not stated choices 
(Lusk and Schroeder, 2004). With our protocol, the economic effects of the 
policy are also covered by the observation of individual price indexes and 
budgets. 
Our findings show that price policies may have a positive effect on the 
nutritional scores of the two groups of women, but that the initial gap between 
the two widen, especially with the subsidies. For the women in the low income 
group this is explained by an initial unfavorable pattern and by weaker price 
elasticities. The redistributive effects are therefore doubly regressive. Moreover, 
the individual price elasticities, that the experimental approach enables us to 
measure, show a wide diversity of behaviors that are counter-effective in close 
to 40% of our sample of poor women. In this group, we observe a high level of 
rigidity with regard to the consumer price of most vegetables – but not fruit – 
and higher price elasticities. 
Context and implications 
In 2009 the average BMI of a Frenchman was 25.4, which is one point more 
than in 1997
1. Currently, 31.9% of Frenchmen are overweight (25 ≤ BWI < 30). 
The prevalence of obesity (BMI ≥ 30) was 14.5% in 2009, against only 8.5 in 
1997. With regard to trend and level, France is still behind the United States 
where the prevalence of obesity is 33.8% and the proportion of overweight (and 
obese) people is 68.0%
2.  
In the country of the “French paradox”, like elsewhere, there is good reason to 
worry about this phenomenon. There is an excessive consumption of added 
sugar, salt and fats, combined with an insufficient consumption of fiber. The 
calorie content of the food eaten is thus increasing. Public policies aim at 
 
1 ObEpi-Roche 2009, 5th national survey on the prevalence of obesity and overweight in France;   
http://www.roche.fr/portal/eipf/france/rochefr/institutionnel/obepi_roche_2009  
2 Flegal et al. (2010), Cutler (2003).  5 
 
                                                
improving the nutritional quality of diets, with a view to curbing weight gain 
and obesity and to limit diseases related to poor nutrition: cardio-vascular 
diseases, certain cancers, diabetes, etc. The cost to society of treating these 
diseases amply justifies the public authorities’ action
3. In France, the PNNS
4 
sets objectives to reduce the consumption of sugars, fat and salt, and to increase 
the consumption of fruit and vegetables, starchy foods, dairy products and fish. 
The nutritional policies of developed countries also have to take a crucial social 
fact into account: excess weight and obesity primarily affect those segments of 
the population that are disadvantaged from the point of view of income and 
education. An effective nutritional policy should therefore not only improve the 
average quality of the population’s nutrition but also reduce existing 
inequalities, or at least try not to worsen them. We know, moreover, that the 
poorest segments of the population are more heterogeneous than the middle 
classes. It is therefore important to ensure that a globally effective policy does 
not prove to be counter-effective for a large segment of the population. 
The poorest and least educated people are fatter than the average and in recent 
years have gained weight faster than other segments of the population. The 
prevalence of excess weight and obesity is inversely proportional to the 
household’s income and to the level of its members’ education. In France the 
correlation between income and weight has risen steeply since 1997. The 
prevalence of obesity is over 20% in the adult population with a household 
income under €1,500 per month, whereas it is less than 10% for households with 
a monthly income of over €3,000. In the United States, annual medical 
 
3 In France, as in the rest of the world, few studies have been undertaken to evaluate with precision the social 
cost of obesity. It is estimated that it accounts for between 2% and 7% of global expenditure on health and close 
to 1% of the European GDP. The most recent study in France, undertaken by the Institut de recherche et de 
documentation en économie médicale, is an evaluation of the costs associated with obesity in this country. This 
study was published in the journal La presse médicale in 2006. It revealed that health expenditures related to 
obesity amounted to 2.6 billion Euros and that the national health insurance fund claimed to have paid out 2.1 
billion Euros (3.3 billion in 2002, if daily compensation for sick leave is included). In 2000, the cost of obesity in 
the United States was more than $117 billion (National Safe Kids Campaign, 2002). 
4 Programme National Nutrition Santé (national health and nutrition program). 6 
 
                                                
expenditures of obese people are 36% higher than those of the rest of the 
population (Sturm, 2002; Finkelstein et al., 2003). Approximately one half of 
the surplus costs ascribable to excess weight and obesity are covered by public 
funds via Medicare and Medicaid (Finkelstein et al., 2003). 
When the public intervention is legitimate, the next question is whether the 
instruments used are effective. Three types of policy instrument can be 
identified. First, information policies compel or encourage firms to label 
products (nutritional facts or nutritional labeling) in order to influence 
consumers’ choices on the basis of more complete information. The second type 
of policy instrument regulates the offer by defining and improving the 
nutritional standards of products, and setting criteria for differentiating products: 
‘diet’, ‘enriched’, etc. The aim is to offer a set of more satisfactory products 
from a nutritional point of view. Finally, the third type of policy instrument, 
price policies (taxes and subsidies), is designed to alter consumers’ incentives by 
urging them to make better nutritional choices. Our study focuses on the 
evaluation of the effects of this third category: price policies aimed at 
influencing consumers’ choices through economic incentives. 
Existing literature  
The effects of targeted food taxes and subsidies have been the focus of a large 
number of empirical studies
5. One set of studies simulates the impact of a given 
price policy on either products (Chouinard et al. 2005, Kuchler et al. 2005) or 
nutrients
6 (Ramezani et al., 1995, Huang, 1996, Huang, 1999, Beatty and 
LaFrance, 2005, Smed et al., 2007, and Nnoaham et al., 2009). In these studies, 
the method is to derive price-elasticities from estimated demand systems. A 
second set of studies considers existing general food tax policies in the 
 
5 They have also been a subject of theoretical interest (see for example Schroeter et al., 2008).  
6 By applying a nutrient conversion matrix to the price elasticities, nutrient elasticities can be derived in order 
measure the average nutrient demand due to changed prices – for instance, a price drop in fruits and vegetables 
would increase intake of fiber, vitamin A, and vitamin C –.  7 
 
                                                
developed world (Caraher and Cowburn, 2005) or specific soft drink taxes in the 
United States (Jacobson and Brownell, 2000; Fletcher et al. 2009). 
Unanimously, these studies underline the weak effects on food behavior of such 
price policies (‘fat tax’ or healthy food subsidies). The weak impact of a price 
policy on BMI or obesity prevalence is due to the consumers’ price inelasticity
7. 
Some conjecture that only a more ambitious policy could succeed in changing 
behavior. The limit here is that the more ambitious the policy considered, the 
more speculative the estimation of its behavioral effects, due to the elasticity 
extrapolation models used. In this paper we propose a totally different approach, 
where behaviors are directly observed instead of inferred.  
The effects of food taxes and subsidies can also be ambiguous. Kim and 
Kawachi (2006) point out potential perverse results for price policies targeted on 
specific classes of products. While people may indeed reduce their consumption 
of such products, they may compensate by consuming nutritionally bad products 
or larger quantities of non-taxed equivalent food.  
Food taxes and subsidies are furthermore said to be extremely regressive 
towards low-income groups. This may be due to the high share of income that 
poor people devote to food (Drewnowski, 2004). A second reason is that the 
poor people pattern of consumption includes more taxed and less subsidized 
food. The key question is whether or not such policies would balance regressive 
income effects with positive health effects for lower-income groups through the 
effects of relative price elasticities. Nnoaham et al. (2009) and Park et al. (1996) 
do not find such an effect. Conversely, for some products, Smed et al. (2007) 
and Jones (1997) find higher price elasticity for lower-income groups. We 
propose a direct measurement of both own and cross elasticities for each income 
group.  
 
7 Given that inelasticity, most authors note that a ‘fat tax’ would be an effective means to raise State revenues. 
For instance, Kuchler et al. (2005) find that a relatively low tax rate of 1% per pound and 1% of value would not 
appreciably alter consumption but would generate $40-$100 million in tax revenues. 8 
 
                                                
The quality of any prediction relative to the efficiency of a nutrition policy 
crucially depends on the accuracy of the elasticity estimates. Existing databases 
clearly encounter this limit, especially for evaluating ambitious innovative 
policies (with large price variations for a wide range of products). Here an 
experimental approach may help. 
In choice experiments, experimental subjects are presented with a set of options 
and asked to choose one. Preferences can thus be observed through various 
levels of prices, not directly observable on the market. Using choice 
experimental methods, we can produce a scale model of a nutritional policy and 
observe real consumers’ actual behavioral reactions (field experiments)
8. A set a 
literature has explored the impact of various product-specific price policies 
using the natural field method
9. For instance, consumers’ behaviors with relative 
price changes have been scrutinized in various contexts, from vending machines 
(French et al., 1997a and French et al., 2001) to self-service restaurants (Jeffery 
et al., 1994; French et al., 1997b; Horgen and Brownell, 2002). These studies 
show that reducing the relative prices of healthier products generates an increase 
in their consumption. French et al. (1997a; 2001) decreased the price of low-fat 
snacks compared to regular snacks in vending machines, and set up 
environmental interventions to determine the effects of pricing strategy on fruit 
and vegetable purchases in school cafeterias (French et al. 1997b). Jeffery et al. 
(1994) replicated with a larger set of products. Horgen and Brownell (2002) 
conducted a similar experiment in a delicatessen-style restaurant, delivering 
health messages in addition to lowering relative prices of healthier products. In 
all these choice experiment studies, results were robust: price reductions had 
 
8 Field experiments are rapidly developing in agricultural economics (Herberich et al., 2009).  The method is 
legitimate since in a naturally occurring context there is a good chance that observed behaviors are consistent 
with real life behaviors (Roe and Just, 2009). 
9 According to the taxonomy proposed by Harrison and List (2004), the environment of a natural field 
experiment is one where the subjects naturally undertake these tasks and do not know that they are in an 
experiment. 9 
 
                                                
consistent and strong effects on purchasing patterns of targeted foods in work, 
school or public settings. 
Several limitations affect these natural field experiments. As the scope of such 
experiments is limited to the environment set by the experimenter (vending 
machine, restaurants, and cafeteria), price changes may affect non-observable 
side behaviors. Substitution and revenue effects may therefore be out of sight.  
These experiments, all based on a limited number of products constituting a 
small proportion of the diet of the subjects observed, all encounter the same 
limits: insufficient control of subjects who can compensate for the observed 
gaps by unobservable gaps in the opposite direction; impossibility of evaluating 
the global effects of the policy in terms of nutritional quality, this quality having 
necessarily to be based on a full diet; impossibility of observing   within-subject 
behavioral changes due to policies; and weak control of the panel of subjects. 
Finally, due to the difficulties of implementation, only subsidy policies have 
been studies by means of this method, as taxes were refused by the field 
protagonists (restaurants, owners of vending-machines, etc.). In this paper we 
propose a framed field experiment
10. Although more abstract, our methodology 
allows us: a) to observe complete daily food intake and thus to control for all 
substitution and revenue effects and to assess nutrition; b) to directly measure 
the individual impact by using a within-subject methodology, allowing to 
observe individuals before and after the policy implementation and thus direct 
and cross elasticities per individuals; c) to sample a specific pool of subjects, 
especially in the poorest segments of the population; and d) to test the impact of 
high tax and subsidy rates. 
 
 
10 Still according to the taxonomy proposed by Harrison and List (2004), a framed field experiment is the same 
as a conventional laboratory experiment but with field context in the commodity, task, or information set that a 
specific subject pool can use. 10 
 
EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL 
Observing “food days” 
In this experiment we observe individual food days (FD). A subject’s main task 
during the experiment is to note down all the food, including non-alcoholic 
drinks that they intend to consumer over the next 24 hours. This interval is the 
minimal lapse of time required to evaluate the nutritional quality of a diet. 
Irrespective of the nutritional policy studied, it is on this minimal scale that its 
impact can be observed, primarily due to crossed elasticities. 
In practical terms, the subjects in the experiment compose their FD by means of 
a software package developed with Medical Expert Systems (MXS)
11. Using 
this software, they can compose their meals by picking products from a tree-
structured database. Once a product has been selected, the subject chooses the 
desired quantity by means of visual aids and quantitative data on volume and 
weight. Each subject can thus finely calibrate each of their food portions. The 
software specifies the nutritional composition of each portion chosen
12. By 
aggregation, each FD composed by a subject can thus be evaluated, nutrient by 
nutrient. On this basis, synthetic nutritional scores can be calculated for each 
FD. The base used for this study consists of 180 products, carefully chosen on 
the basis of average consumption by French people (the products are listed in 
Annex A). For each product, a price is displayed for a reference quantity and for 
the portion chosen by the subject. The rate is linear. The software calculates and 
displays the budget of a FD in the process of being created. Copies of the screen 
are presented in Annex B. 
                                                 
11 http://www.mxs.fr  
12 For each product the software indicates the quantity per kilogram of calories, proteins, lipids, cholesterol, 
polyunsaturated fatty acids, mono-unsaturated fatty acids, saturated fatty acids, carbohydrates, fibers, calcium, 
iron, magnesium, phosphor, potassium, sodium, copper, zinc, manganese, selenium, vitamins A, B1, B2, B3, B5, 
B6, B9, B12, C, D, E, water, added sugar, Docosahexaenoic acid.  
 Two price policies and four product categories 
The ‘before policy’ prices correspond to retail prices at the time of the 
experiment in the largest French food cybermarket, Ooshop, a subsidiary of the 
Carrefour group. All products were also available at the same prices in a 
Carrefour hypermarket close to the venue of the experiment. The participants 
were informed of this source of retail prices during the experiment.  
In this section we present the experimental analysis of the impact that two price 
policies have on subjects’ behaviors when they compose a FD. The first policy 
subsidizes fruit and vegetables (F&V). In the experiment this translates into a 
30% decrease in the price of fruit and vegetables. The second policy combines a 
decrease in the price of healthy products (including the F&V of the preceding 
policy and other healthy products (OHP)), and an increase in the price of 
products whose consumption should be limited for health reasons, i.e. unhealthy 
products (UP). The categorization of products is based on the SAIN, LIM 
classification
13 (Darmon et al., 2009). SAIN is an index of ‘good’ nutrients and 
LIM is an index of ‘bad nutrients’
14. These indexes are based on quantities of 
nutrients compared to the recommended nutritional intake. Thus, the subsidized 
products present a high SAIN and a low LIM. The taxed products present a low 
SAIN and a high LIM
15. The products that belong to neither of these categories 
are called ‘neutral products’ and are not eligible for taxes or subsidies. The 
product categories are presented in Annex A.  
11 
 
                                                 































LIM  where nutrientP are the ‘good’ nutrients, nutrientl are 
the ‘bad’ nutrients, and RV and MRV are the recommended intake. 
15 The thresholds were set at 5 for SAIN and at 7.5 for LIM. 12 
 
                                                
The price policies are implemented implicitly, that is, without justification of 
their nutritional purpose. Otherwise, the experiment would be a test of both a 
price policy and an information policy
16.  
Annex xx provides an exhaustive presentation of the product classification. The 
180 products selected: fruit and vegetables, other healthy products, unhealthy 
products, and neutral products. 
The level of price variation for the policies is set at +/-30% of the initial price. 
We thus give the ‘best chances of success’ to the studied policy. If the policy 
happens to be ineffective in the laboratory, it will a fortiori be ineffective in a 
real life setting.  
The subjects 
The 107 subjects in our experiment were women between 20 and 52 years old. 
A total of 74 of them had a household income of €700 per consumption unit
17 
and therefore belonged to the decile of the lowest incomes in France (1D). Our 
reference sample (RG) consisted of 33 women whose household income per 
consumption unit was over €1050 and who thus belonged to the income 
category greater than or equal to the third decile (see Annex C). 
The women with low incomes were approached through specialized institutions: 
health clinics, charity grocery stores and other charities. Portable computers 
were used to run experiments at their homes in the poorest suburbs of Grenoble 
and Lyon. The sessions of the reference groups took place in the GAEL 
experimental economics laboratory at the Grenoble INP. 
The subjects of the two groups all received the same incentives, the same 
choices and the same product retail prices. They were remunerated a set rate of 
 
16 Particularly in the case of poor population groups, it appeared in the debriefing at the end of the experiment 
that the subjects had often failed to intuitively perceive the objectives of the evaluated policies. 
17 A consumption unit is equal to 1 for the first person in the home, 0.5 for the other adults in the home, and 0.3 
for children under the age of 14 in the home. 13 
 
€25 for their participation. Moreover, the food choices were real and effective 
(see below) and generated real purchases of food products, which obviously 
varied from one subject to another. 
The experimental protocol 
The basic principle governing the protocol architecture is to create the means to 
observe, for the same subject, a FD ‘before’ and a FD ‘after’ the implementation 
of a price policy, and then to analyze, from within, the impact of that policy on 
the individual’s choices. The main steps of the experiment are presented in 
Table 1.  
Table 1. About here 
After their arrival in the experimentation room, the subjects filled out a 
questionnaire with socio-demographic data: occupation, income, household size, 
etc. Each subject was then invited to provide an exhaustive description of their 
food day the previous day (FD0), that is, all the food and drinks that they had 
consumed over the past 24-hour day (midnight to midnight). FD0 was obtained 
on a declarative basis, that is, without incentives. This ‘24-hour reminder’ 
served to familiarize the participants with the computer interface of the 
experiment and to structure their thoughts on what one of their food days was. It 
enabled the experimenter to assess, in terms of budget and structure of the 
product choices, the difference between this reminder and the following three 
days which constituted the core of the data studied. The hypothesis was that this 
24h reminder enhanced the realism and parallelism of the experiment. 
Each subject then individually composed a FD for the next day (FD1), drawing 
on the list of 180 products presented via the computer interface. The products 
were all labeled with their retail price. FD1 served as a reference in the impact 
assessment. In the following phase, each subject composed a FD2 as an 
alternative to FD0 (only one FD will be randomly selected at the end of the 14 
 
experiment). At this point the price of fruit and vegetables was 30% lower than 
the previous day. Both the old price (crossed out) and the new, reduced price 
were displayed. Finally, in the third phase each subject was asked to compose a 
last food day, FD3, presented as an alternative to the preceding two phases and 
integrating the second price policy. The prices of F&V and those of the OHP 
were now 30% lower, while those of UP were 30% higher. 
For FD1, FD2 and FD3, the subjects were informed that their choices would 
generate real sales at the end of the session. For this purpose, subjects were 
informed that a subset of the 180 products, invisible for them during the 
experiment, was placed in the room adjacent to the experimentation room. For 
all of a subject’s choices corresponding to the available products, the portions 
chosen were effectively sold at the end of the session. In order to avoid effects 
of wealth and substitution, the subjects were informed that only one FD out of 
FD1, FD2 and FD3 would be selected randomly for a real sale of the products. 
To end the experiment, just before the actual sale of the purchased products 
selected randomly, the subjects filled out the questionnaire on their eating 




The initial food consumption pattern is unfavorable to the 
poorest income-groups 
Those consumers with the lowest incomes choose fewer nutritionally healthy 
products (F&V, OHP) and more unhealthy products (UP). Measured in terms of 
physical quantity (Table 2) for our four product categories, the discrepancies are 
all unfavorable to the poorest subjects, both in relative terms (proportion of 
consumption) and absolute terms (quantities consumed). Notwithstanding a 15 
 
                                                
larger food intake overall (+339g), the reference group consumes fewer 
unhealthy products (-127g of UP) and more of all the other products. The gap is 
particularly wide in respect of healthy products other than fruit and vegetables 
(+185g of OHP). The reference group consumes more neutral products (+176g). 
The difference between the two categories is smallest in respect of fruit and 
vegetables (+105g in the reference group). 
The unhealthy products (UP) have relatively high prices, which weigh heavily in 
the poorest people’s food budget
18. On average, subjects in the decile with the 
lowest incomes spend €1.57 on these unhealthy products (UP), whereas on 
average the reference group spends only €0.94 on the same products. UP 
account for 30% of the lowest income-groups’ food budget, against 16.7% in the 
highest income groups, and a difference of €-0.64 in absolute terms. This figure 
can be compared to the surplus cost, for the wealthiest group, of the additional 
consumption of healthy products, which is €+0.88 (€0.41 for F&V and €0.47 for 
OHP). Compared to the reference group, the poorest subjects’ lower 
consumption of healthy products is offset by their higher consumption of 
unhealthy products, in terms of budget. 
The reference population tends to buy products that cost less per kilogram than 
the products bought by poor consumers. The only exception is fruit and 
vegetables. Relative prices, measured here in price per kilogram, are not 
identical for the two groups of women. Whereas on average the wealthiest buy 
more expensive fruit and vegetables and other healthy products than do the 
poorest (on average, €+0.22 per kilo more for F&V), they spend less on other 
products, especially neutral ones (on average, €-0.17/kg less). In total, the price 
per kilo of the poorest consumers’ purchases is 21 centimes more than those of 
the reference population. 
 
18 Beatty (2010) finds that the poor pay less than average because they spend a greater share of their income on 
foods where quantity discounting occurs. In this study, we do not take in account quantity discounting. 16 
 
Table 2. About here 
The Fruit and Vegetable Policy (FVP) induces behavioral changes 
which improve the nutritional quality of the two groups but worsen 
the inequalities 
For women in both income groups, the F&V policy (FVP) has positive direct 
effects, on average (the volume consumed increases). Both groups buy more 
fruit, especially. On average, the consumption increase is significant for both 
groups (Table 3). The individual data indicate that a majority of the subjects 
directly benefit from this policy in terms of nutrition.   
Note that, particularly for the poorest subjects, the increase in the consumption 
of F&V is essentially the result of consumption of more fruit and not of more 
vegetables. 
Table 3. About here. 
The direct positive effect of the FVP is nevertheless weaker in the case of the 
poorest subjects. In nutritional terms, they benefit less from the policy as they do 
not increase their consumption of fruit and vegetables as much as the reference 
group does. In quantities (weight), the additional consumption of fruit and 
vegetables consecutive to the FVP is twice as much for the reference group as 
for the poorest subjects (+197g against +102g). Thus, the subsidizing of F&V 
increases the differences initially observed, where the poorest subjects were 
already disadvantaged. After the implementation of the policy there is a 200g 
gap between the two groups. 
The indirect effects of the FVP on the quantities consumed are more favorable 
to the wealthiest subjects, primarily due to the reference group’s increase in the 
consumption of other healthy products (OHP). The first indirect consequence of 
the FVP is common to both groups: it reduces the consumption of unhealthy 
products. The reduction is however small (-14g for the poorest and -5g for the 17 
 
others). This result is interesting: the reduction in the price of fruit and 
vegetables could have resulted in a transfer of the monetary gains to these 
products, but that is not the case. The most obvious indirect effect of this FVP is 
the increase in the consumption of other healthy products by the reference group 
(+33g on average). This increase widens the nutritional gap between the socio-
economic categories, created by the FVP, since the increase in the consumption 
of other healthy products is not found in the lowest income group. 
The direct effect on budgets of the reduction of the price of fruit and vegetables 
differs in the two groups of women. The fruit and vegetable budget of the 
wealthiest remains unchanged, despite the lower prices, whereas that of the 
poorest women shrinks. The average fruit and vegetable budgets of the poorest 
category declines by €-0.18 but remains at €-0.02 for the reference group. The 
gap in the fruit and vegetable budget between the two categories widens from 
€+0.16 to a total of €+0.57. 
The main indirect effect of the FVP on budgets is the increase in expenditures on 
unhealthy products (UP) by the reference group. There is not however any effect 
on the nutritional quality since the wealthy consumers tend simply to buy better 
quality products within this group of products. Thus, they eat more fruit and 
vegetables but also seek enjoyment. The reference group’s average budget for 
UP increases by €0.36 compared to that of the poorest group, both before and 
after the FVP. As Table 2 shows, this increase is due not to an increase in 
volumes but to a distinct evolution of the price per kilo of the products chosen 
by the two groups of women. The average price for these products declines by 
€-0.29 for the poorest group, but increases by €+1.17 for the reference group. 
The average price gap for these products is now €+1.40 for the reference group. 
They now buy all products, excluding the neutral products, at a higher price than 
do the poorest women. 18 
 
The ‘Nutritional Profiles’ Policy (NPP) is Pareto improving, 
but subsidizing health products other than fruit and vegetables 
widens the inequality gap more than does taxing junk food 
Taxing UP has significant nutritional effects of the same amplitude on the 
volumes consumed in both social categories: a reduction of -69g of products 
consumed, on average, in both groups (Table 4). This good result must however 
be qualified in one respect: since the poor consume more UP before the policy, 
the gap remains, although the improvement is evident for everyone. The 
qualitative reactions within this group of taxed products contrast sharply from 
the one social group to the other. Relative prices evolve in opposite directions: 
positive for the poorest, who really feel the price increases due to the tax; and 
negative for the reference group which adapts its consumption to the new prices 
by shifting its choices to cheaper products. 
The results are very different for healthy products. The expansion of the scope 
of subsidies has contrasting and ambiguous effects on the two social categories. 
With regard to the consumption of fruit and vegetables, the NPP leads to 
identical results to those of F&V for the poorest subjects, but is less effective for 
the middle classes. Performances in terms of increasing in the volumes 
consumed are now leveled down and identical for the two groups, whereas they 
were far better for the reference group with F&V. For the reference group, this 
leveling is explained by a shift of its average consumption of subsidized 
products towards other healthy products (dairy, fish, etc.). Hence, subsidizing 
healthy products is effective for everyone, but is socially inequitable. 
Table 4. About here. 
Compared to the FVP, in terms of volumes of fruit and vegetables consumed, the 
NPP is equally effective for the poor and less effective for the reference group. 
Consequently, by leveling down the results, the NPP becomes socially more 
equitable. Compared to the initial pattern of consumption before any policy was 19 
 
implemented, the consumption of fruit and vegetables under this nutritional 
profile policy increases significantly in both groups. The growth is +122g for the 
low-income group and +128g for the reference group, that is, a narrow social 
gap of +6g in favor of the richest subjects. In relative terms, the performance of 
this policy is identical to that of the FVP for the poor group, but is far less 
effective (about half as effective) for the wealthier subjects. Thus, for fruit and 
vegetables, the NPP proves to be fairer but less effective.    
Evolution of consumption in terms of volume of “other healthy products” 
subsidized here, such as fruit and vegetables prices reduced by -30%, contrasts 
sharply in the two groups of women. Whereas it declines in the low-income 
group, it increases significantly in the reference group. The socially equitable 
effects of the NPP found for fruit and vegetables are not found for the other 
healthy products, now subsidized likewise. Whereas the consumption of 
products in the reference population increases by +133g, that is, 18.9% 
compared to choices before the policy, the consumption of these other healthy 
products decreases by -10g in the poorest group. The total difference in the 
volume of these products consumed is now 327g. 
The taxation of unhealthy products significantly reduces the average volumes 
consumed, in much the same way for the two social groups. The effect of the 
taxation of unhealthy products (UP) is significantly beneficial to both social 
groups. The volume gained is identical for both groups (-69g). In relative terms, 
however, given the weight of these products in the poorest group, the reduction 
is smaller for this group (-21.5% against -35.3 for the others). 
The NPP is overall nutritionally favorable to both groups of women; the effects 
of the tax are of the same amplitude in the two groups. The same applies to the 
subsidy for fruit and vegetables, which is less effective for the reference group 
than is the FVP alone. On the other hand, with the NPP, the social gap widens 
with the other healthy products, which the poorest women tend not to buy, notwithstanding the subsidy. The average decrease of about 30% of the 
consumption of unhealthy products is significant for both groups. It is 
comparable to the 25% average increase if the consumption of fruit and 
vegetables in both groups. On the other hand, the effects for the other healthy 
products are contrasting in the two groups, even though they are weaker, 
including in the wealthiest group (+18.9%). 
Apart from the fairly good nutritional results of the NPP in all cases, its effects 
on food budgets and on relative prices worsen social inequalities. Manipulating 
relative prices through taxes and subsidies has two different types of 
consequence on social inequalities. The first consequence is linked to gaps in the 
initial patterns of consumption, before any adjustment. In our case (Table 1), the 
pattern of inequalities penalizes the poorest group in two respects: they consume 
fewer products whose price decreases under the effect of subsidies, i.e. F&V and 
OHP (46.9% against 52.9% for the reference group), and they consume more 
products whose prices increase under the effect of the taxes. The Laspeyres 
synthetic index
19 clearly captures these first effects (Table 5). While the effect of 
inequality is weak for the FVP (the Laspeyres base 100 for the period before the 
policy decreases to 93.3 for the poorest group and 91.6 for the reference group), 
the gap becomes far wider with the NPP. In this case, the Laspeyres of the poor 
group is 92.25, whereas it drops to 87.6% for the wealthier one. We thus see 
that, in the absence of any adjustment of consumption behaviors, the dual policy 
of subsidy and taxation impacts more on the relative prices paid by the poor than 
on those paid by the wealthier classes. 
The second effect of the widening inequality gap is the result of the lowest 
income group’s poor adjustment of consumption to the price variations. The 
20 
 
                                                 
19 We use the following indexes: Laspeyres :   and Paasche:   
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Paasche synthetic index, adjusted on the final consumption pattern, and not on 
the initial one like the Laspeyres index, clearly shows these inequalities, which 
in this case compound the ones mentioned above. Once again, it is with respect 
to the NPP that the contrast is most striking. Whereas, due to the right 
adjustments by consumers in the reference group, the Paasche synthetic index is 
77.7 with the NPP policy (we see the low weight of the tax for this group of 
consumers), the same index is 91.3 for the poor group. In other words, there is a 
gap of 13.6 between the two categories. As we have seen, the adjustments of the 
reference group are twofold: first, they consume fewer taxed products and more 
subsidized products; and, second, they change to different products within the 
ranges of subsidized products, to benefit from price cuts, and likewise alter their 
choices in the range of taxed products to avoid price increases. Women in the 
poorer group either make these adjustments to a lesser extent, or do not make 
them at all. 
To conclude, note that the tax pressure felt by each of the two groups is 
contrasting and regressive: the poor receive fewer subsidies and pay more taxes. 
Table 5. About here 
Graphe 1. About here. 
Table 6. About here 
The individual results indicate behaviors contrary to policy 
expectations for a large proportion of the disadvantaged population 
Close to 40% of the poor women in our sample have positive individual price 
elasticities for fruit and vegetables. The individual data that the experimental 
method enables us to calculate show sharp contrasts between individuals, 
especially in the low income group. Graph 2 eloquently shows price elasticities 
for fruit and vegetables for both population groups under the FVP. For the 
reference population, the elasticities are negative in 93% of cases. In other 22 
 
words, the quantities consumed increase when the prices decrease, albeit to 
varying degrees. The contrast is stark in the group of poor woman. Here we find 
that close to 40% of the individuals in the group have a positive elasticity; that 
is, their consumption of fruit and vegetables decreases as the prices decrease. 
Graph 2. About here 
Fat and thin… Apart from the effects on social categories, do the policies have 
beneficial effects for the populations most affected by nutritional problems and, 
in a country like France, particularly those groups with the highest BMI? Graph 
3 shows the elasticities for fruit and vegetables for normal and overweight 
groups. We see that elasticities are more favorable to overweight individuals, 
who benefit more from the NPP policy than individuals with a normal BMI. In 
the lowest income groups, overweight individuals react better than those with a 
normal weight. Among the poor people, overweight individuals have superior 
absolute F&V price elasticities in NPP (p=0.0992). Overweight individuals have 
superior absolute HOP price elasticities in NPP (p=0.0946). 
Graph 3. About here 
 
CONCLUSION 
Some might say yes to taxes but no subsidies, but that is excessive. Our findings 
show that taxes do indeed play a positive nutritional role in both the reference 
group and the poor group of women. Both groups reduce the quantities of their 
average consumption of unhealthy products in significant and identical 
proportions. A socially more effective policy could of course be expected, since 
consumption of these unhealthy products is far higher in the group of women 
with the lowest incomes, and our tax does not narrow down this gap. But can 
this actually be achieved via  prices? Probably not, considering the socially 
regressive effect of this tax with unhealthy products. To obtain a change of 23 
 
identical magnitude, the poor pay this tax three times more than the reference 
group, even if this varies widely within the group. 
Subsidies on healthy products also have a positive on average effects for both 
groups. The regressive effects are however significant, not only in economic 
terms but also from a nutritional point of view. A policy of subsidizing fruit and 
vegetables only widens the initial gaps in nutritional quality between the two 
groups. The poor initially consume less fruit and vegetables, and the effects of 
the policy are twice as weak in their case when they increase the quantities 
consumed. The indirect effects of this FVP on the quantities of other products 
consumed further worsen the consequent nutritional inequalities. The increase in 
the consumption of unhealthy products by the reference group offsets nothing in 
nutritional terms; it is simply a deadweight effect, as some of the gains of the 
subsidy are used to increase the quality of the UP consumed (rather than their 
quantity).  
Overall, neither of the two policies successfully reduces social inequalities as 
regards nutrition. At best, taxes on unhealthy products do not worsen these 
inequalities, at least not in nutritional terms. In economic terms – price indexes 
and redistribution, capture of the tax and subsidies – the two policies are 
regressive. 
The inequalities induced, which are clearly evident in the average tendencies in 
the two groups, are probably accentuated by sharply contrasting individual 
behaviors that the experimental method highlights. A very significant proportion 
– up to 40% in certain cases – of the women in the low income group show 
positive price elasticities: they make poorer nutritional choices under a price 
policy that is intended to improve them. 
To conclude, this experimental method is clearly a significant contribution to the 
observation of nutritional choices and to the study of ambitious public policies 







Table 1. Steps in the experiment 
Phase Initial 
questionnaire  

























Modality Declarative  Declarative  With 
incentives 




Table 2. Initial pattern of consumption for the two groups 
 1D  RG  Difference   
RG-1D 
F&V  20.7% (410g)  22.2% (515g)  +105 g 
OHP  26.2% (519g)  30.4% (704g)  +185 g*** 
UP  16.3% (323g)  8.5% (196g)  -127 g 
NP  36.8% (727g)  39.0% (903g)  +176 g 
Volumes (expressed in weight)  
Total  100% (1.979g)  100% (2.318g)  +339 g 
F&V  22.2% (€1.16)  27.9% (€1.57)  +€0.41* 
OHP  23.5% (€1.23)  30.2% (€1.7)  +€0.47** 
UP  30.0% (€1.57)  16.7% (€0.94)  €-0.63 
NP  24.3% (€1.27)  25.2% (€1.42)  €+0.15 
Values (Budget structure)  
Total  100 (€5.23)  100 (€5.63)  €+0.40* 
F&V €2.83/kg  €3.05/kg  €+0.22/kg 
OHP €2.38/kg  €2.41/kg  €+0.03/kg 
UP €4.85/kg €4.79/kg €-0.06/kg 
NP €1.75/kg €1.58/kg €-0.17/kg 
Prices (unit per kilo)  
Total €2.64/kg  €2.43/kg  €-0.21/kg 
 
NOTE: With a Mann-Whitney test, 
* refers to the 10% level 
** refers to the 5% level 
*** refers to the 1% level. 
 
 
Table 3. Fruit & Vegetable Policy 
 1D  RG  Difference   
RG-1D 
Direct Effect  
(Price -30%) 




+95g***  Volumes 
Indirect Effect  OHP  -1.0% (-5g)  +4.7% (+33g)  +38g 26 
 
25.6% (514g)  29.8% (737g) 









































Values (Budgets)  




































Nota. At the top of each cell we find the relative and absolute trends before and after the implementation of the 
F&L policy. Below we find the data for the period of the F&L policy, with data comparable to those of Table 1. 
For example, 1D consume in average 512g of F&V in JA2 representing 25.5% of the whole diet. 1D increase the 
consumption of F&V by 102g compared to JA1 which makes a relative increase of 24.9%. 
 
 
Table 4. Nutrient Profile Policy 
 1D  RG  Difference 
RG-1D 
F&V +29.8%  (+122  g)*** 
27.0% (533g) 
+24.9% (+128 g)** 
26.6% (643g) 
+6g 
OHP -1.9%  (-10  g) 
25.8% (509g) 










+21.4% (+261 g)*** 
61.2% (1479g) 
+149g* 
Direct Effect (Price 
+30%) 
UP  -21.5% (-69 g) 
12.9% (254g) 
-35.3% (-69 g)** 
5.3% (127g) 
0g 
Indirect Effect  NP  -7.2% (-52 g) 
34.3% (675g) 





Global Effect  -0.5% (-9 g) 
100% (1,970g) 
+4.3% (+99 g) 
100% (2,416g) 
+108g 















Values (budgets)  
NP  -25.4% (€-0.32/kg)  -38.7% (€-0.55/kg)**  €-0.23 27 
 
21.8% (€0.92)  18.4% (€0.87) 

























Price indexes and prices  
 





Nota. At the top of each cell we find the relative and absolute trends before and after the implementation of the 





Table 5. Price indexes
20 
 LD  RG  p (Test MW) 
Laspeyres 93.35 91.64 0.6269  FVP 
Paasche  91.35 88.66 0.0101** 
Laspeyres 95.25 87.60 0.0857*  SLP 
Paasche  91.29 77.71 0.0000*** 
 
Table 6. Mean taxes and subsidies for the two groups   
F&L subsidy  Healthy product subsidy  Tax on unhealthy 
products 
 
After pol.  Without 
modifying 
choice 
After pol.  Without 
modif. 
After pol.  Without 
modifying 
choice 
Mean  €0.42   €0.35   €0.78   €0.72   €0.36   €0.47  
Standard 
deviation  0.32  0.27  0.51  0.47  0.52  0.73 
LDG 
Median  €0.34   €0.29   €0.68   €0.62   €0.19   €0.16  
Mean  €0.66   €0.47   €1.46   €0.98   €0.10   €0.28  
Standard 
deviation  0.46  0.36  0.97  0.55  0.12  0.38 
RG 
Median  €0.59   €0.40   €1.10   €0.90   €0.07   €0.11  
p (test MW)  0.0017*** 0.0718*  0.0000*** 0.0127**  0.0002***  0.1828 
 
                                                 






Tableau 7. Impact of policies according to the IMC  









F&V  495 464 436 331 
OHP  555 565 584 545 
UP  401 242 251 357 
Volume (g) 
NP  686 699 710 861 
F&V  €2.58   €1.41   €1.21   €0.91  
OHP  €0.95   €1.25   €1.39   €1.38  
UP  €2.00   €0.98   €1.53   €1.99  
Value 
NP  €1.25   €1.11   €1.24   €1.54  
 
 










F&V +49  +125 +148 +77 
OHP +163 -14  -46  +49 
UP -51 +35  -21 -47 
Volume (g) 
NP -66 -51 -106  -14 
F&V  €-1.05   €-0.17   €-0.01   €-0.24  
OHP  €+0.17   €-0.21   €-0.35  +0.14  
UP  €-0.46   €+0.27   €-0.25   €-0.60  
Value 
NP  €-0.19   €-0.29   €-0.19   €-0.43  
 
 









F&V -20  +102 +175 +155 
OHP -5  0  +23  +166 
UP -71 -36 -77 -119 
Volume (g) 
NP +4  -23 -120  -131 
F&V  €-0.34   €-0.18   €+0.02   €-0.04  
OHP  €-0.16   €-0.38   €-0.28   €-0.25  
UP  €-0.54   €+0.21   €-0.15   €-1.02  
Value 























Laspeyres - 1st decile Laspeyres - Reference
Paasche - 1st decile Paasche - Reference  
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Annexes 
Annex A. Products 
 
-  The Fruits and Vegetables: 
The Fruits: avocado - banana - lemon - clementine/mandarin - dried prickly pear - orange 
juice - kiwi - orange - grapefruit - pear - fruit salad - apple 
The Vegetables: garlic - vegetable mix for soup - eggplant - carrot - grated carrot - cooked 
white cabbage - cauliflower - cucumber - zucchini - spinach - haricot bean - flageolet - string 
beans - frozen string beans - jardinière - lentils - macedoine (mix of vegetables) - onions - 
peas - chick peas - pepper - steamed potatoes - mashed potatoes - ratatouille - tomato and 
cucumber salad - green salad - vegetable soup - ready-made vegetable soup - tabbouleh - 
tomato 
 
-  The Healthy Products: 
slim cereal bar - grilled beef steak - cod - coffee - hake - prawns - roasted chicken leg - 
fromage frais 20% fat content - semi-skimmed milk UHT - skimmed milk UHT - whole milk 
UHT - rabbit - coalfish - roasted duck fillet - whiting - mussel – hard-boiled egg - diet 
Orangina – whole-wheat bread - pepper - fish soup - tea - tinned tuna - brown trout - plain 
yoghurt with bifidus - plain yoghurt 
 
-  The Neutral Products: 
Camembert cheese - chocolate cereal - sweetened cereal - chewing gum - sweetened 
chocolate powder – diet coca-cola - sweetened stewed apple - coq au vin - plain cornflakes - 
chocolate cream dessert - dried dates - tap water - mineral water - sparkling water - sweetener 
- Emmenthal cheese - grated cheese - oil - groundnut oil - raw ham - boiled ham - apple juice 
- grape juice - ketchup - lasagne - sweet corn - mustard - hazelnuts - walnuts – omelet - 
farmhouse loaf - meat paté - pastry - frozen small potato cakes - raisins – Reblochon cheese - 
white rice – Roquefort cheese - potato salad - ham and cheese sandwich - sardines in oil - 
tomato sauce - smoked salmon - salt - steak mince - herbal tea - salad dressing - fruit yoghurt 
 
-  The Unhealthy Products: 
fresh cream - sweetened pancakes - croissant - toasted cheese and ham sandwich - éclair - 
caramel custard – non-salted crisps - goat cheese - soft cheese - processed cheese - exotic 
dried fruit and seeds - ice cream - sliced potatoes baked with milk - cottage pie - hamburger - 
hot dog with mustard - madeleine - margarine - mayonnaise - chocolate mousse - apricot 
nectar - salted cashew - black olive - Orangina - chocolate-filled pastry - lamb chop/grilled 
mutton - mutton couscous - sweet roll - sandwich loaf - chocolate spread – salted pistachio 
nuts - pizza with cheese, meat and vegetables - breaded fish - salted crisps - pound cake - pike 
quenelle - quenelle in sauce - quiche lorraine - ravioli with meat and tomato sauce - roast pork 
- kebab sandwich - frankfurter - salami-type sausage - fruit cordial - sorbet - sugar - fruit pie - 









































 Annex C: 
 
1
st Decile Group (1D)   →   under €810 per household per consumption unit
21. 
Reference Group (RG)   →   Over €1,007 per household per consumption unit. 
 
Description of the 3 categories 
 
 1D  RG 
Frequency (Proportion)  95 (61.3%)  33 (21.3%) 
Age (Standard Deviation)  35.3 (7.04)  34.8 (6.90) 
BMI (Standard Deviation)  25.7 (6.44)  23.9 (4.31) 


















Level of education and occupation 
 1D  RG 
Level of Education 
                                                 
35 
 
21 Consumption Unit = 1 for the first member of the household, Consumption Unit = 0.3 for the members of the 
household under 14 years old and Consumption Unit = 0.5 for the other members of the household over 14 years 
old. Primary School  4.4%  0.0% 
Secondary School  23.1%   6.1% 
A-level   41.8%  33.3% 
Undergraduate 22.0%  27.3% 
Graduate 6.6%  15.2% 
Master’s and over  2.2%  18.2% 
Occupation 
Unemployed 32.2%  15.2% 
Housewife 35.6%  6.1% 
Other unemployed  15.6%  9.1% 























1D  0.0%  4.4%  48.4%  28.6% 13.2% 2.2%  3.3% 
















Elasticity at average point: 
 
FVP  Products  1D  RG  p (Test MW) 
Price Elasticity (-30%)  F&V  -0.822  -1.278  0.0345** 
Crossed-price Elasticity  Healthy  0.032  -0.158  0.7130 
Crossed-price Elasticity  Unhealthy  0.139  0.084 3  0.4552 
Crossed-price Elasticity  Neutral  0.263  0.2667  0.1811 
SLP  Products  1D  RG  p (Test MW) 
Price Elasticity (-30%)  F&V  -0.857  -0.830  0.5490 
Price Elasticity (-30%)  Healthy  0.166  -0.629  0.1582 
Price Elasticity (+30%)  Unhealthy  -0.798  -1.176  0 .5933 
 
Only the direct price elasticity of F&V in FVP is significant (on an individual test)  
 